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Abstract
We propose a framework for estimating time-varying systemic risk contributions that
is applicable to a high-dimensional and interconnected financial system. Tail risk de-
pendencies and systemic risk contributions are estimated using a penalized two-stage
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fixed-effects quantile approach, which explicitly links time-varying interconnected-
ness to systemic risk contributions. For the purposes of surveillance and regulation
of financial systems, network dependencies in extreme risks are more relevant than
simple (mean) correlations. Thus, the framework provides a tool for supervisors, re-
flecting the market’s view of tail dependences and systemic risk contributions. The
model is applied to a system of 51 large European banks and 17 sovereigns during
the period from 2006 through 2013, utilizing both equity and CDS prices. We pro-
vide new evidence on how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank link-
ages evolved over the European sovereign debt crisis, and how they are reflected
in estimated network statistics and systemic risk measures. Finally, our evidence
provides an indication that the fragmentation of the European financial system has
peaked.
Keywords: systemic risk contribution; tail dependence; network topology; sovereign-
bank linkages; Value-at-Risk
JEL classification: G01, G18, G32, G38, C21, C51, C63
1 Introduction
A lesson from the global financial crisis has been the propensity for company-specific risk
to spill over to other firms. These spill-overs arise from contractual linkages in conjunc-
tion with heightened counterparty risk, but also from price effects generated, for instance,
by fire sales. The result of these externalities and spill-overs has been the freezing of
interbank markets observed at the height of the global financial crisis in October 2008.
The market freeze was followed by a much longer period of interbank market fragmenta-
tion during the European sovereign debt crisis, with banks in core European countries no
longer willing to finance banks in the periphery.
Another key feature, particularly salient during the European sovereign debt crisis,
has been the interplay between fiscally strained sovereigns and stressed banks. An im-
paired banking sector has a limited ability to support economic activity, which in turn
further strains public finances, eventually putting in question the ability of the sovereign
to support the banking system in case of a need. The ECB (2011, 2014) has continuously
identified this adverse feedback loop as one of the key risks to financial stability in the
euro area. A better ability to understand and monitor the fragmentation of European fi-
nancial markets as well as the interdependence between banks and sovereigns is thus of
utmost importance for central banks and policy makers.
Quantifying these relationships empirically is challenging due to (i) the high dimen-
sionality of the underlying financial and sovereign system, (ii) lack of public data on
cross-linkages and detailed individual characteristics for a large cross-section of finan-
cial institutions and sovereigns, and (iii) the time-variability of network connections and
systemic risk contributions. Moreover, for purposes of surveillance and regulation of fi-
2
nancial systems, network dependencies in extreme risks are more relevant than simple
(mean) correlations. This requires focusing on connections between (time-varying) tails,
as, e.g., represented by conditional quantiles, expected shortfall or related tail measures
of the underlying risk distributions. Finally, the empirical methodology should ideally
produce measures and estimates that are empirically tractable and easily interpretable.
In this paper, we address these challenges and contribute to the literature both method-
ologically and empirically. In terms of methodology, we propose an econometric frame-
work that allows for complex tail risk networks while producing sufficiently precise and
robust estimates given the available data over relatively short (but rolling) time spans.
Empirically, we provide new insights into the time-varying tail risk dependencies and
spillovers between European banks and sovereigns, especially during the 2008 global fi-
nancial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. We show how network
interconnectedness, fragmentation and interactions between European financial institu-
tions and sovereigns changed over this time period and how the state of the financial
system is reflected in the topology of the underlying network.
Our methodology builds on the framework proposed by Hautsch, Schaumburg, and
Schienle (2015) (henceforth HSS2015) and Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2014).
The underlying idea is to quantify the systemic impact of an individual company by the
marginal effect of a firm’s time-varying Value at Risk (VaR) on the VaR of the entire
system. To statistically identify the relevant tail risk drivers of a specific company out of
a high-dimensional set of potential characteristics (including the tail risk of other com-
panies), HSS2015 propose using a statistical regularization and shrinkage method. The
selection of individual-specific tail risk drivers gives rise to a risk network, determining
to what extent the VaR of a company is driven by the tail risk of other companies. This
information is then explicitly utilized in a second step, where the marginal systemic rele-
vance of an individual firm is quantified using a quantile regression of the system VaR on
the VaR of the respective company while controlling for the firm-specific risk drivers and
additional economic state variables.
The explicit quantification and utilization of network dependencies distinguishes HSS2015
from alternative methods for measuring and predicting systemic risk. Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2011) propose the concept of CoVaR, corresponding to a company’s conditional
VaR, given that the return of some other company reaches a certain benchmark value (e.g.,
its individual VaR). As discussed in HSS2015, there is a major conceptual difference to
our methodology. The CoVaR does not measure the direct marginal effect of an individ-
ual VaR on the VaR of the system, but rather corresponds to the system VaR conditionally
on the return of the particular company realizing its (pre-estimated) VaR. Moreover, the
CoVaR does not capture any network spillovers and can only vary over time through the
effects of individual VaRs. Another complementary approach to quantify systemic risk
builds on Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010). Here, systemic risk is
defined as the propensity of a financial institution being undercapitalized when the finan-
cial system is under stress. This idea is put forward by Brownlees and Engle (2012) by
proposing an econometric approach to measure the so-called marginal expected shortfall
(MES), mainly building on time series (GARCH) methodology for asset returns. In the
same spirit, Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2015) measure systemic risk by the expected
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capital shortfall of a financial institution in a financial crisis and quantify it for a wide
range of non-U.S. equities. These approaches ultimately build on the conditional asset
return distribution of an individual company given distress of the market and aim at de-
termining the capital surcharges of systemically important banks. Löffler and Raupach
(2013), however, argue that pure market-based measures’ ability to identify systemically
important banks is limited. On the one hand, this is due the fact that extreme risks are
not easily assessed based on return data. On the other hand, concepts like the CoVaR or
the MES ignore tail risk dependencies induced by the underlying financial network struc-
ture. An important advantage of our approach is to explicitly take these dependencies into
account when constructing the measures for systemic risk contributions. This informa-
tion provides valuable additional insights into underlying tail risk connections and risk
channels as perceived by the market.
In this paper, we extend the methodology introduced by HSS2015 in two directions.
First, we adapt the approach to make it feasible in situations, where the density of the
network is high and the underlying sample period is comparably short. In such a sit-
uation, individual companies may face tail risk spillovers from many others, making it
necessary to account for large sets of individual-specific tail risk drivers when estimat-
ing companies’ marginal systemic risk contribution in a quantile regression of the system
VaR. The requirement to control for a large number of different risk factors, while having
a comparably short estimation window, makes standard estimates inherently inefficient
and unstable and - in the extreme case – even infeasible. Therefore, we propose an adap-
tive version of the standard shrinkage technique for determining the relevant risk drivers
not only among other banks but also among sovereigns. The use of relatively short estima-
tion windows is driven by the need to account for time-variations in companies’ systemic
riskiness and underlying network connections. Accounting for time variations via rolling
window estimates, however, is crucial when the framework is used to surveil and monitor
the system building the basis for macro-prudential regulation.
To address the trade-off between estimation robustness and the ability to capture the
time-variability of the underlying relationships, we propose to combine the two-step quan-
tile framework with a panel fixed effects approach. While controlling for company-
specific fixed effects, we keep the model sufficiently parsimonious by imposing group-
wise common parameters. In contrast to HSS2015, this reduces the dimensionality of the
estimation problem and allows us to estimate the individual companies’ marginal effect on
the system VaR in one step. We show that this approach is empirically tractable and bal-
ances model flexibility and estimation robustness in the given context where the financial
network is of high dimension and dense. Second, when estimating a company’s systemic
relevance, we explicitly account for the interconnectedness of an institution, measured by
its network centrality. In particular, we allow an institution’s marginal systemic relevance
to be time-varying and depending – among other things – on its interconnectedness. We
empirically show that the latter is a significant factor of the firm’s systemic risk contribu-
tion.
Empirically, we contribute to the literature in two major directions. First, focusing
on 51 large European banks allows us to cover a substantial fraction of the European
banking system. Moreover, by analyzing data up to 2013, we are able to study the effects
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of the global financial crisis, its aftermath and the transition into the European sovereign
debt crisis on the fragmentation and integration of the European financial system. Second,
bringing together both banks and sovereigns in a network estimated based on CDS returns
yields novel insights on the interplay between banks and sovereigns. We quantify and
visualize time-varying tail dependencies, spillover directions and the density of networks,
and show how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank linkages evolved over
the European sovereign debt crisis.
Beyond the growing literature on estimation of systemic risk contributions, our paper
is also related to the papers investigating the sovereign bank-interlinkages, such as Ejs-
ing and Lemke (2011), Alter and Schüler (2012), Arnold (2012), Bruyckere, Gerhardt,
Schepens, and Vennet (2013), Alter and Beyer (2014), and Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and
Suarez (2014). The key difference to the aforementioned papers, which mainly analyze
contagion or spillover effects between sovereign and bank CDS spreads or credit rating
downgrades, is the ability of our approach to incorporate both sovereigns and banks into
tail risk networks and to track how their interconnectedness evolves over time.
Furthermore, methodologically our paper is related to earlier studies analysing conta-
gion and co-movement in banks’ equity prices, in particular to Gropp and Vesala (2009),
who analyse cross-border contagion among European banks in 1994-2003 and to Bae
and Stulz (2003) and Hartmann and Vries (2004), who focus on cross-country spillovers.
Finally, our paper is closely related to the increasing literature analysing financial net-
works, contagion and systemic risk, see, e.g., Allen and Gale (2000) and Cont and Santos
(2013)1. A major difficulty in this literature is to identify connections between banks. Un-
fortunately, for a wide range of banks, detailed balance sheet information reflecting coun-
terparty risk is rarely available. Thus researchers are forced to look for suitable proxies
which are widely available and sufficiently reflect network dependencies. For instance,
Minoiu, Kang, Subrahmanian, and Berea (2013) quantify the connectivity between banks
based on BIS bilateral locational statistics representing stocks of cross-border assets held
by banking systems. Alter, Craig, and Raupach (2015) utilize a dataset of credit expo-
sures of the German banking system. They study the effect of capital rules combining
individual bank characteristics and interconnectivity measures and show the usefulness of
capital rules based on eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix.
The key findings of our paper are as follows: We first document how the topology of
our tail-dependence networks evolves over time. In particular, we observe that the den-
sity of the tail dependence network based on equity prices increases from 2006 onwards,
peaks around the height of the global financial crisis and significantly declines thereafter.
We further show that during the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2013 financial
markets fragment along national borders. This is reflected by a strong increase of domes-
tic (within-country) linkages. This increase is more pronounced for economies engulfed
by the sovereign debt crisis. Third, the CDS price networks show that financial market
fragmentation during the sovereign credit crisis is accompanied by increased intercon-
nectedness between sovereigns and banks. Again, this increase is more pronounced in
economies at the center of the sovereign debt crisis.
1See Chinazzi and Fagiolo (2013) for a recent review of this literature.
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We then present banks’ contribution to systemic risk at the height of the sovereign
debt crisis. Unsurprisingly, banks from EU-IMF programme countries exhibit on average
high contributions to systemic risk. We also document that marginal systemic relevance
increases with size, leverage, and interconnectedness. The systemic risk ranking at the
height of the sovereign debt crisis differs markedly from the one obtained during the
peak of the global financial crisis when large, international banking groups dominate the
ranking.
From a methodological point of view, we show the importance of explicitly linking
an entity’s interconnectedness to its (time-varying) systemic risk contribution. This in-
formation provides valuable additional insights into underlying tail risk connections and
risk channels as perceived by the market, and is an important advantage of our approach
compared to concepts like the CoVaR or MES, which do not explicitly take into account
interconnectedness. Additionally, our proposed method, the combination of the two-stage
panel framework with a panel fixed effects approach, turns out to provide sufficiently ro-
bust estimates given data availability and the necessity to address a dense tail risk network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the estimation
methodology while Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the results and is
divided into three subsections: Subsection 4.1 illustrates the estimated time-varying tail
risk networks, Subsection 4.2 describes the sovereign-bank interactions, while Subsection
4.3 presents the systemic risk contributions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
Our empirical methodology for estimating systemic risk contributions is based on two
steps. The first step is necessary for determining the time-varying topology of the under-
lying tail risk network of banks and sovereigns. While the risk network contains valuable
economic information on its own, it is indispensable for identifying the systemic risk con-
tribution of a bank in a densely interconnected system. The outcome of this step is the
estimated conditional VaR of each institution given the underlying network structure and
economic state variables. The second step explicitly utilizes information on the identified
network to estimate an individual institution’s marginal impact on the system VaR.
2.1 Time-Varying Bank-Sovereign Networks
We construct generalized tail risk networks for the European bank-sovereign system by
adapting and extending the approach in Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2015). In
particular, we account for potentially time-varying bank-sovereign spillovers and ex-
plicitly include sovereigns as important parts of the generalized European financial net-
work. The main idea is to empirically determine a network link from bank/sovereign j to
bank/sovereign i, whenever the tail risk of i is (positively) affected by the distress of j.
Denoting the equity or CDS return of bank/sovereign i by X it , the tail risk of i is reflected
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Pr(−X it ≥ V aRiq,t|Rit) = q, (1)
with V aRiq,t denoting the (negative) conditional q-quantile of X
i
t .
2 The distress of a
bank/sovereign is identified by the corresponding return being below its empirical 10%







where Q̂0.1 is the unconditional 10% sample quantile of X
j
t .
The entire set of tail risk drivers of a bank/sovereign i thus consists of loss exceedances
of banks/sovereigns other than i, captured by a vectorN it with elementsNt,j for j 6= i, and
additional observable control variables Zit . These externalities Z
i
t contain lagged macro-
financial state variables, and, in case of banks, i-specific balance sheet characteristics.
Specifying V aRit as a linear function of the regressors yields











In theory, it appears straightforward to estimate this model by standard linear quantile
regression techniques (see Koenker and Bassett (1978)) accounting for time variation in
the structural relation by rolling windows. In practice, however, this is infeasible as the
number of loss exceedances N it potentially affecting i is large. Including the entire set N
i
t
as regressors in the model would result in highly imprecise and unstable estimates. More-
over, (sequential) tests on the statistical significance of individual variables are virtually
infeasible with outcomes hardly interpretable.
Following HSS2015, we therefore statistically identify the subset of relevant i-specific
loss exceedances, denoted by N (i)t , from the full set of potential network influences N it
by a model shrinkage technique. In particular, we use a weighted version of the least
absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) approach for quantile regression as
introduced by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). The idea is to run a penalized quantile





























where τ denotes the number of observations, Z̃it and Ñ
i
t denote the set of potential (de-
meaned) regressorsZit andN
i
t , ρq(u) is the quantile loss function ρq(u) = u(q−I(u < 0))
at level q with the indicator I(·) being one for u < 0 and zero otherwise, and σ̂k is the
empirical standard deviation of the k-th component in N it .
The coefficient λi is a penalty parameter, which penalizes regressors which do not
sufficiently contribute to the objective function, and thus are not relevant for the model.
Due to the penalization, the coefficients of these regressors are shrinked towards zero.
Hence, the penalization component allows us to identify relevant loss exceedances as
those regressors with sufficiently large marginal effects. Correspondingly, a regressor
2We use the convention that V aRq is defined as the negative conditional q-quantile such that higher
levels of risk are reflected by higher levels of VaR.
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is de-selected if its (adaptive) LASSO estimate in α̃i2 is close to zero. The strength of
the penalization is therefore governed by λi with the number of eliminated regressors
increasing in λi. For instance, for λi = 0, we obtain the standard quantile regression
problem according to Koenker and Bassett (1978). As loss exceedances of banks and
sovereigns might be of quite different magnitudes, it is important to allow for regressor-
specific penalizations wik. Both λ
i and wik are chosen in a data-driven way by optimizing
based on the score of (3) with remaining constants and thus maximizing the in-sample
predictive ability of the resulting post-LASSO quantile specification. The quality of the
in-sample fit is evaluated based on the model’s backtesting performance. The details of
this procedure are presented in the Appendix. Finally, retaining only the regressors, which
are not de-selected by the weighted LASSO results into the corresponding ’post-LASSO’
VaR specification.
The weighted quantile LASSO approach is performed for each bank and sovereign
i. The final set of post-LASSO regressors yields the set of i-specific tail risk drivers.
Then, the weighted LASSO-selected i-specific loss exceedances N (i)t constitute directed
network impacts to bank i. By moving through all banks in the system, we thus obtain
a network graph showing tail dependence relationships among banks conditional on the
control variables Zit .
In contrast to HSS2015, we allow for time-variations in network dependencies and
perform the analysis based on rolling windows, where sample windows of 24 months are
rolled over at a yearly frequency.3 In particular, at the beginning of each period, indexed
by t0, we determine relevant risk drivers based on the weighted LASSO approach utilizing
information from the previous two years. Networks are thus year-specific and can vary















where N (i,t0)t is the set of i-specific loss exceedances selected by the LASSO procedure






2 are obtained by
the year-t0 post-LASSO quantile regression.
This approach is performed in Section 4 to estimate (i) tail risk networks of finan-
cial companies based on equity returns with sovereigns’ bond returns serving as (non-
penalized) state variables and (ii) joint tail risk networks of both banks and sovereigns
based on corresponding CDS returns. For all networks, we use a q = 5% VaR. For more
details on the choices of Zit and N
i
t , see Section 4.
2.2 Evaluating Systemic Impact
We define the systemic risk contribution of a bank as the total realized impact of a change
in a bank’s VaR on the VaR of the entire system. Following HSS2015, we denote this
3With an estimation window of 24 months, a sufficient amount of observations occur in the extreme 5
and 10% quantiles such that point estimates have an acceptable precision and are still based on the most
recent information only. In order to limit computational complexity but to gain an overall picture of the
time evolution of the network, we use yearly rolling windows.
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effect as realized systemic risk beta. To quantify this measure, the system VaR, denoted
by V aRst , is defined as the VaR of a value-weighted portfolio of firms representing the
financial system. Moreover, as explained in more detail below, we build groups g =
1, . . . , G of institutions, which allows us to estimate group-specific marginal effects of
certain variables instead of individual-specific marginal effects.
Thus, the effect of the estimated V̂ aR
i,t0
t on V aR
s
t in a dense network within a given
group g of banks at time point t in year t0 is obtained from
















where Bit denote firm-specific characteristics, and net
i,t0
t denotes an i-specific local net-
work measure, defined as the logarithm of one plus the out-degree of node i in the network
topology. Furthermore, γi,t0 is a firm-specific fixed effect, R(i,t0) is a value-weighted in-
dex of the VaRs of all banks selected as being relevant for bank i in the first step, and Zs
contains lagged macro-financial state variables.
The parameter βt0g is the (time-varying) marginal effect and is referred to as systemic
risk beta for group g. The specification implied by (5) constitutes a major difference to
HSS2015. In HSS2015, the system VaR is linked to the VaR of each individual institution
while controlling for its specific tail risk drivers. This results in a set of equations for
V aRst with i-specific regressors. In a high-dimensional and dense network, however, this
yields a high-dimensional system of highly parameterized specifications which becomes
practically infeasible and numerically instable if the sample size is not sufficiently high.
To overcome this problem and to make the approach feasible in high dimensions, we
therefore suggest to restrict several parameters to be common and group-specific and
estimate V aRst in one step.
Apart from time variations of βt0g arising from the rolling window estimation, we al-
low for additional variation within a two-year period (indexed by t0) by modeling βt0g as
a function of firm-specific characteristics Bit and the i-specific network measure, net
i,t0
t .
The latter characterizes the firm’s interconnectedness in the corresponding year-t0 net-
work topology at time t, and thus explicitly links a firm’s marginal systemic relevance to
its role in the underlying tail risk network.4 This specification extends the initial setting
by HSS2015 to explicitly allow for feedback effects between a firm’s interconnectedness
and its VaR’s marginal effect on the system VaR. To keep the approach computationally
tractable, we assume βt0g being linear in its components within a group g ∈ {1, . . . , G} of
















The grouping of institutions is necessary in order to balance robustness of the obtained
beta measure against the variability required for consistent estimation of the effect. Hence,
pooling together firms which are similar in terms of their (average) marginal systemic
impact and their marginal effects with respect to the variables Bit , allows group-wise
estimation of the parameters in (6) instead of individual-wise. In contrast, working with
4The specification neti = log(1+out-degreei) exploits the directed nature of the network. Conditioning
on the risk driver index R(i,t0) controls for incoming linkages.
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only one large panel without subgroups for all institutions would induce too much rigidity
on the common parameters. The inclusion of the individual-specific fixed effect, γi,t0 ,
and the aggregated indicator for network spillover influences on beta, R(i,t0), allow to
control for i-specific effects and provide a robust way to obtain unbiased estimates of
βt0g . In practice, we suggest a simple and straightforward data-driven procedure to obtain
adequate groups, which we outline below in the empirical section. Thus, the choice of
grouping is objective and yields a stabilizing effect on the obtained systemic risk beta in
a dense network.
The full specification is then estimated by a single (pooled) quantile SUR system re-
gression with the inclusion of appropriate group and bank specific dummies. The system
is obtained analogously to a system formulation of a set of linear equations. The latter
are given by (5) for each company i. The system then gives rise to a vector contain-
ing (repeated) equation-specific realizations of V aRst , a block-diagonal regressor matrix
collecting equation-specific regressors in each block, and a stacked vector of parameters.
The latter, however, is restricted as the coefficients of control variables from the systemZs
and from the network R(i,t0) are common across all institutions, and influences of balance
sheet characteristics on βt0g () only vary across subgroups in estimates of δ
t0
1,g. Likewise
Zs is common across all equations. Note that despite group-specific common parameters
in (6), an individual bank’s systemic risk beta βt0g () still varies on an individual basis as
it depends on i-specific variables Bit and net
i,t0
t . Moreover, γi,t0 differs across all banks
and captures individual fixed effects. This model and estimation strategy yields stabilized
parameter estimates by exploiting as much cross-sectional variation as possible without
losing consistency of the estimate for βt0g . Moreover, we can estimate all coefficients of
(5) and (6) in one step, in contrast to a multiple-equation estimation as in HSS2015. Fi-
nally, the included fixed effects γi,t0 capture potentially neglected bank-specific covariates
making the approach more robust to potential misspecification.












Based on this measure we assess the overall systemic importance of institutions. It reflects
the total realized effect of an increase in a bank i risk level on the risk of the entire system.
This impact consists of the direct impact via the idiosyncratic VaR but also of a potential
change in the marginal systemic effect via βs|it . Our rankings in the following are based
on realized systemic risk betas in the 5%− V aRs.
3 Data
Our dataset consists of 51 large European banks, which we choose based on the following
criteria. First, we select the largest European banks, covering up to 90% of the Euro-
pean banking system’s total assets (in 2010), which results in 74 banks. Second, as the
empirical analysis requires equity price data, we keep only the publicly traded and listed
banks in the sample, which leaves us with 53 listed banks, covering 72.4% of the Euro-
pean banking system’s total assets. Third, two further banks (Bankia and Österreichische
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Volksbanken) are dropped from the sample due to data limitations. The list of the 51
banks in the sample is shown in Table 1. The financial system in the second stage is
represented by the Stoxx Europe 600 Financial Services index, where we use daily obser-
vations. For each institution, we use daily equity price returns and as bank specific risk
drivers quarterly balance sheet data covering the period from 01/07/2006 to 30/06/2013.
For the CDS networks, we employ available daily changes (first differences) in 5-year
senior CDS spreads.
As V aRi-specific control variables Zit , we choose a set of bank-specific balance sheet
characteristics. These include leverage, measured as total assets over total equity, to cap-
ture the fragility of a bank. Furthermore, we also use loan loss reserves and return on
assets, which represents asset quality. Additionally whereas the cost-to-income ratio and
the price-to-book ratio measure management quality. The return on equity measures a
bank’s capacity to generate earnings, while the ratio of net short-term borrowing to total
liabilities and the loan-to-deposit ratio capture liquidity risk. The size, measured as total
assets, proxies for the bank being too big to fail. As all balance sheet data is available only
quarterly whereas stock or CDS prices are daily, each piece of balance sheet information
enters the regression at its release date to obtain results in real-time.
The dataset also includes macro-financial state variables which are all observed daily.
We use the Euribor-OIS spread as a barometer of distress in money markets covering
both liquidity and credit risk. The VDAX index measures implied volatility in the Ger-
man stock market, proxying for investors’ risk appetite. The macro-financial state vari-
ables listed above are also used as control variables Zst in the second stage regression.
Moreover, Bit contains the subset of balance sheet characteristics with a distinct macro-
prudential interpretation, in this case leverage and size as defined above.
To represent sovereign risk, we also collect data on the sovereigns of the countries
where the banks are headquartered. Thus, our sample includes the following sovereigns:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The data include
the daily yields on 10-year benchmarks bonds, the slope of the yield curve as measured by
the daily yield difference between 10-year and 2-year bonds as well as the daily changes
(first differences) of 5-year sovereign CDS spreads5.
Tables 1 and 2 provide basic summary statistics of the stock and CDS returns of the
banks and sovereigns in the sample. All financial variables employed in the analysis as
well as the regressors mentioned above are tested to be stationary. The data source for all
economic and financial variables is Bloomberg.
5Greece could not be included in the CDS network analysis as there was no trades of Greek CDS
following the sovereign debt restructuring in March 2012 until May 2013.
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4 Results
4.1 Time-varying tail risk networks of banks
Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 3 and 4 visually and quantitatively characterize the evolution
of tail dependence networks of all financial companies over all six (overlapping) two-year
sub-periods. Here, the control variables Zit in (2) contain company-specific characteris-
tics and macroeconomic state variables as described in Section 3. We measure a bank’s
interconnectedness by its network degree and graphically illustrate it by the size of the
nodes in Figures 1 and 2. In the figures, we label all banks whose degree is above the
75th percentile of the degree distribution in the respective subperiod. The shape of each
network is obtained by minimizing the length of all aggregated network connections be-
tween all institutions. Correspondingly, the most connected firms are located in the center
of the network graph.
The main findings can be summarised as follows. First, the density of the network
increases between 2006 and 2008, peaks in the 2008-2010 period and declines thereafter.
At the height of the global financial crisis (2008/09), we observe the strongest estimated
interconnectedness between European banks, as reflected by the size of the nodes and
the number of identified linkages. The network structure in the subsequent periods (from
2010 onwards), however, indicates a clearly different picture. Here, the interconnect-
edness between the banks strongly declines and the European banking system becomes
more fragmented. This is most obvious in the period 2010-2012, reflecting the height of
the European sovereign debt crisis.
According to Figures 1 and 2, the density of the network clearly varies over time indi-
cating that the financial system is moving through different states. This is confirmed by
the corresponding network densities reported in Table 3.6 The network density increases
from 0.07 in the first subperiod to 0.08 at the height of the global financial crisis. In con-
trast, during the European sovereign debt crisis, the network density decreases to 0.04.
The pattern is intuitive as one would expect tail dependence between banks to increase
during a financial crisis. Conversely, a stronger role of sovereigns in transmitting shocks
should be reflected in sparser tail dependencies between banks. Since sovereign bond
returns serve as non-penalized control variables, a stronger impact thereof might be re-
sponsible for the decline of network density after 2008. Tail dependence networks where
sovereigns are not used as control variables but as risk drivers (see Section 4.2) confirm
the view that the decline of network densities in bank-only networks during the period
2010 to 2013 reflects mainly the increasing role of sovereigns. On the other hand, the
increase in network densities from 0.04 to 0.05 between the two last subperiods suggests
that the intensity of the sovereign debt crisis has to some extent receded.
The colour of the nodes, indicating the countries where the banks are headquartered,
illustrates the impact of country-specific developments on the network structure. While
during the 2006-2008 period, the most interconnected firms originate pre-dominantly
6The network density is calculated as the number of actually observed connections in the network di-
vided by the number of possible connections for the given nodes.
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from Spain, but also from France, Portugal and Ireland, in the subsequent period also
Italian and British banks move to the center of the network. Both network graphs depict
pronounced country-specific clusters with strong cross-country links, in particular, among
banks in the center of the network. These developments might already indicate upcoming
problems in the banking sector of these countries, partly driving the European sovereign
debt crisis in 2012/13. While these ’national clusters’ disappear in the height of the global
financial crisis (reflected by the 2008-2010 subgraph), they become very pronounced in
the aftermath.
The sovereign debt crisis in particular is characterized by a strong fragmentation of
the financial network with ’domestic’ linkages (i.e., linkages between companies within a
country) becoming increasingly prominent. This is confirmed by Table 3, showing that the
share of domestic linkages (relative to all linkages) has increased from 0.28 in the 2008-
2010 sub-period to 0.52 in the 2010-2012 sub-period. Again, the slight decrease to 0.45
in the latest sub-period might reflect a relaxation of the sovereign debt crisis. This is most
obvious for financial institutions in Greece and Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and
(partly) France. Particularly Greece and Cyprus move towards the fringe of the network.
In the 2010-2013 sub-periods, they are totally disconnected from the rest of the network.
Also Spanish and Portuguese banks jointly leave the center of the network (2009-2011),
with in particular the Portuguese banks becoming increasingly disconnected from the rest
of the system.
Table 4 provides the shares of domestic links separately for countries, which have been
particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis (in particular, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and all other countries. It turns out that countries affected by
the sovereign debt crisis display on average a higher share of domestic linkages. This
is most pronounced during the 2009-2011 and the 2010-2012 period, and is consistent
with the notion that financial fragmentation has primarily affected banking systems in the
European periphery.
During the financial crisis periods (Figure 1), we observe that some banks are partic-
ularly strongly interconnected. In the 2006-2008 sub-period, the Spanish banks Banco
Santander, Banco de Sabadell and Banco Popular Espanol are in the center of the tail
dependence network. The French banks BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole and Societe Gen-
erale, as well as the Portuguese Espirito Santo Financial Group, the Belgian Dexia, the
Irish Bank of Ireland, the British Royal Bank of Scotland and the German Commerzbank
stand out as strongly interconnected banks. In the 2007-2009 sub-period, the Spanish
banks Banco de Sabadell and Banco Popular Espanol are most strongly interconnected,
while in 2008-2010 this role is taken by the Italian Banco BPI. Banco de Sabadell and the
Royal Bank of Scotland constantly appear among the most interconnected banks in the
first three of the six subperiods. Finally, Credit Agricole is also highly interconnected in
the first sub-period and at the height of the financial crisis.
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4.2 Sovereign-bank interaction
Complementing the analysis above by a corresponding analysis based on CDS data opens
up a valuable additional perspective. CDS prices reflect investors’ expectations on de-
fault risks, and thus are explicitly connected to extreme market movements. Moreover,
utilizing CDS returns allows us to construct and analyze a network containing both fi-
nancial companies and the underlying sovereigns. This complements the analysis above,
where information on sovereign risk enters the analysis only via respective bond returns
used as economic state variables. According to the ECB and the IMF7, the European
sovereign debt crisis is characterised by the interplay of fiscally constrained sovereigns
and weak banking systems. Exploiting CDS prices enables us to study to what extent this
relationship is also reflected in the tail dependence networks.
The network construction differs from the procedure explained in Section 4.1 in the
following way: First, instead of using equity returns as the underlying variable we utilize
CDS returns of banks and sovereigns. Accordingly, bank and sovereign CDS returns are
both penalized in the weighted LASSO approach. As illustrated below, we will have a
lower level of penalization, which is reflected in higher network densities. Second, when
modeling the VaR of a bank, Zit consists of bank-specific balance sheet characteristics and
macro-financial state variables (as described in Section 3). For the VaR of a sovereign,
we only include macro-financial state variables.
Figures 3 and Figure 4 present the corresponding CDS-based networks. The figures
reflect the implications of the sovereign debt crisis in the sense that some sovereigns (rep-
resented by square vertices), mostly those affected by the crisis, move towards the center
of the networks. This is particularly true in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
and during the rise of the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). Particularly, the CDS tail
risks of France, Italy and Spain become deeply connected with the tail risks of financial
companies. Italy stands out as the most important sovereign according to this topology,
but also France and Spain exhibit a high degree of interconnectedness in 2010-2012. This
shape persists also in 2011-2013, with Portugal, Ireland and Austria also gaining impor-
tance. The centrality of the German sovereign, on the other hand, is comparatively low,
confirming Germany’s role as an anchor of stability as opposed to a transmitter of tail
risk.
Table 5 shows that the evolution of network density over time resembles that of the
bank networks above until the period 2008-2010. In both cases, they peak during 2008-
2010. The CDS-based networks, however, reach another high during 2011-2013, for
which the network density is equal to the crisis peak level. This suggests that tail de-
pendence as measured by network density in sovereign-bank networks can serve as an
indicator for the intensity of the crisis. While the 2010-2012 period was just as critical
to the survival of the European Monetary Union as the 2008-2010 period, the former was
not detected as problematic by pure bank networks.
7See, e.g., ECB Financial Stability Reviews (2011, 2012) or the IMF Global Financial Stability Reviews
(2011, 2012).
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The increase of sovereigns’ interconnectedness is particularly true for countries which
have been strongly affected by the sovereign debt crisis (so-called ’crisis countries’), i.e.,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. According to Table 6, the interconnectedness of ’cri-
sis countries’ and ’non-crisis countries’ is relatively similar during the global financial
crisis (2006-2008).8 In the subsequent periods, however, we observe a clear increase of
the average centrality of ’crisis countries’, while the centrality of the other countries is
affected much less. These results indicate that a simple network statistic, as the network
degree, captures substantial information about the evolution of a sovereign’s contribution
to systemic risk.
The share of sovereign-bank linkages, as shown by Table 7 supports this view: During
the global financial crisis, ’crisis countries’ show, on average, a slightly lower share of
sovereign-bank linkages than the others. With the advent of the European sovereign debt
crisis, however, this reverts. The share of sovereign-bank linkages of ’crisis countries’
increases, while that of the other countries remains at about the same level. Hence, this
is not only due to the increasing interconnectedness of a sovereign, but obviously due to
the increase of linkages to financial institutions. Italy displays a particularly high share of
sovereign-bank linkages, whereas that of Germany is comparatively low. In contrast, the
time evolution of financial fragmentation, as represented by the share of domestic link-
ages, resembles that of the bank networks analyzed in Section 4.1. Again, fragmentation
peaks during 2010-2012 before receding slightly.
4.3 Systemic risk contributions
Building on the estimated banking network structure in Section 4.1, we estimate the sys-
temic risk contribution of a bank based on (5) and (6). The choice of the underlying
grouping follows two criteria: On the one hand, banks within a group should preferably
be similar in terms of their average marginal systemic impact and in how the characteris-
ticsB influence this effect. In this case, the coefficients of components of the systemic risk
beta (6) are captured sufficiently well by the corresponding common parameters within the
group. We aim to keep the number of groups small to ensure the availability of a sufficient
number of observations per group and thus the precision of the resulting estimates. In-
vestigating different combinations and number of groups, we find that a regression based
on three groups is the most appropriate. In particular, the first group contains all banks
below the overall empirical median in size and below median in leverage; the second is
below median in size and above median in leverage, or vice versa; and the last is above
median in size and above the median in leverage.
Figure 5 shows the estimated systemic risk network at the height of the European
sovereign debt crisis in June 2012. It stems from the baseline specification used in Sec-
tion 4.1. While depicting the underlying network structure, we visualize the magnitude
of the estimated systemic risk beta, the corresponding VaR and the resulting total effect
corresponding to the product of the two and referred to as realized systemic risk. Again,
8The first period is discarded due to lack of data for Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.
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the node sizes reflect the quartiles of the corresponding underlying (cross-sectional) dis-
tributions with banks being in the respective top quartile explicitly labeled.
The first two plots of Figure 5 highlight the differences between the individual and the
systemic perspective. The banks that rank highly in the marginal systemic relevance dis-
tribution are comparatively large and well known entities, including BBVA and Santander
from Spain, or Barclays, HSBC, and Royal Bank of Scotland from the UK. The banks that
rank highly in the VaR distribution, on the other hand, are mainly from crisis countries.
For instance, all banks headquartered in Greece and Cyprus are in the highest quartile of
the VaR distribution. At the same time, they exhibit only moderate correlations with the
left tail of the risk index. Conversely, the Swedish banks display a comparatively strong
correlation with the risk index, but are safe individually.
The third plot of Figure 5 shows the distribution of realized systemic risk, thus con-
taining the individual and the systemic perspective. Banks in the fourth quartile of the
distribution tend to rank highly in one risk metric and to exhibit an intermediate level in
the other metric. Only three banks which are typically considered as belonging to the core
euro area are in the fourth quartile of the realized systemic risk distribution: Dexia, KBC,
and Natixis. Perhaps more surprisingly, this is true for only one bank each from Italy
and Spain, despite the pressure exerted by financial markets at this stage of the sovereign
debt crisis. Less surprisingly, five banks from the crisis countries are present in the fourth
quartile of the realized systemic risk distribution.
Table 8 presents the overall ranking of institutions based on realized systemic risk betas
reporting also its multiplicative components. In Table 9, the focus is on marginal systemic
relevance and the ranking is based purely on this factor in June 2012. Moreover, it pro-
vides insights into its driving parts by listing the associated group as well as the impact of
bank’s size, leverage and interconnectedness. The table shows that the estimated systemic
risk beta increases with size and leverage as captured by our grouping. The last column
demonstrates that more interconnected banks likewise display a higher degree of tail de-
pendence. Thus, size, leverage, and interconnectedness affect the estimated systemic risk
beta in line with prior expectations. More importantly, the results suggest that traditional
balance sheet characteristics alone provide an incomplete account of systemic relevance.
Additionally, we show the results of our analysis for another key period, October 2008,
right after the default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Similarly to the anal-
ysis above, Figure 6 illustrates the marginal systemic relevance, the Value-at-Risk and
realized systemic risk contributions of the individual European banks during the peak of
the global financial crisis. Likewise, Tables 10 and 11 show the overall ranking based on
the realized systemic risk as well as its components. In October 2008, we observe the
highest systemic risk for Dexia, Bank of Ireland, Royal Bank of Scotland, Commerzbank
and KBC. In case of Dexia, Royal Bank of Scotland and Commerzbank, this is explained
by a high estimated systemic risk beta, and in particular high leverage and size. In con-
trast, the high estimated systemic risk contribution of Bank of Ireland and KBC is mainly
explained by a high level of Value-at-Risk. The difference between the estimated sys-
temic risk rankings in October 2008 and June 2012 is noticeable. While Dexia, Barclays,
Royal Bank of Scotland as well as Irish Life and Permanent rank high in terms of their
estimated systemic risk contributions in both periods, the top ranking banks clearly differ.
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In the latter period, several banks from countries participating in the EU-IMF programme
occupy the highest ranks, while in the former period, large, international banks such as
Royal Bank of Scotland, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole, Barclays, Societe Generale and
Lloyeds rank highly.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the systemic risk beta, Value-at-Risk and realized
systemic risk conditional on whether banks have received a capital injection in the fourth
quarter of 2008.9 All risk measures point in the same direction and are higher for those
banks that were subject to capital injections. The realized systemic risk measure com-
bining both the individual and systemic perspective is apparently better at discriminating
between the two groups than either of the other measures. This is intuitive as many of the
banks that failed at the height of the financial crisis were the large international banks.
Figure 8 presents the same comparison for the second quarter of 2012. In this period,
a slightly different picture emerges. As in 2008, banks that were re-capitalized in the
second quarter of 2012, exhibit a higher median Value-at-Risk and thus are considered as
being fragile by market participants. The systemic risk beta, however, appears to be lower.
Though this results seem to be counterintuitive at first glance, it becomes plausible when
considering the identity of the banks. Actually, four of the eight banks that received a cap-
ital injection were Greek.10 The re-capitalization followed the Private Sector Involvement
in March 2012. Thus contagion links between Greek banks and the rest of the European
banking system had been severed by then. This is consistent with the structure of the tail
dependence network, where the separate component formed by Greek and Cypriot banks
suggests that these were subject to different shocks than the rest of the European banking
system.
Figure 9 shows how in the case of four sample banks, the marginal systemic rele-
vance evolves over time. Particularly Allied Irish and Dexia exhibit a considerable time
variation. The marginal systemic relevance of Allied Irish peaked before Ireland signed
the economic adjustment programme with the Troika in the second half on 2010. By
June 2012, it then declined to less than a quarter of its maximum. Analogously, the
marginal systemic relevance of Dexia was at its all time high in the run-up to its first
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illustrate the fact that network effects matter. In particular, it seems that interconnected-
ness is comparatively more important for the below median leverage and size banks in
group 1 (such as Allied Irish), and the above median and size banks in group 3 (like Bar-
clays or Dexia) than banks in group 2 with leverage and size being in opposite categories
(such as Santander).
9Data on capital injections come from Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2014). The following banks
were recapitalized in October 2008: Credit Agricole, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Dexia, Erste Bank
Group, Societe Generale, KBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Swedbank.
10The following banks were re-capitalized in the second quarter of 2012: Alpha Bank, Banco Comercial
Portugues, Monte dei Paschi, Banco BPI, Marfin, National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Piraeus.
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t ). The plot associated with Allied Irish sug-
gests that up to 2011 about 70% of the bank’s marginal systemic relevance was due to
interconnectedness. Similarly, our estimates attribute about 40% of Dexia’s marginal sys-
temic relevance before the second bailout to interconnectedness. Both banks have a zero
contribution of interconnectedness in the penultimate and the last two subperiods, respec-
tively. This follows from an out-degree of zero in the corresponding tail dependence
networks.
4.4 Robustness Checks
To validate our analysis, we conduct various robustness and sensitivity checks: First, we
analyze the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the risk index R(i,t0).
While the form of weighting (e.g., equal-weighting versus value-weighting) does not
qualitatively change the results, its role as a control variable for a consistent estimation of
systemic risk betas is distinct. Actually, omitting R(i,t0) influences the estimates of sys-
temic risk betas and consequently the resulting systemic risk ranking. Second, we check
the dependence of beta estimates on the number of underlying groups. Using, for in-
stance, an even rougher categorization based on two groups only, has very mild effects on
the final outcomes. Hence, our estimates show sufficient stability with respect to the un-
derlying grouping. Third, we redo the analysis by including asset growth as an additional
control in the vector B. This extension, however, produces multi-collinearity effects in-
ducing unstable estimates. Therefore, a specification with leverage, size and netit as the
drivers of time variation in systemic risk beta turns out to be sufficient. 11
Generally, it has been shown that network components substantially increase the over-
all performance of individual Value-at-Risk models in terms of resulting backtest p-
values (Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2015), Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle
(2014)). Moreover, if macroeconomic and balance sheet characteristics of financial insti-
tutions are data-drivenly penalized, they are often de-selected by the LASSO procedure
when controlling for tail network effects, which themselves are determined as highly sig-
nificant (see Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2015)). We find that the inclusion of
sovereign tail effects helps to further augment the model fit for banks’ idiosyncratic risk
during the sovereign debt crisis. In particular, we obtain an 8.2% increase of the me-
dian backtest p-value across all crisis countries when comparing the model with included
sovereign tail network effects to the model based on a network of financial institutions
only.12 Furthermore, network effects substantially contribute to the systemic risk beta.
This is illustrated in Figure 9 for representative examples of each of the groups. In par-
ticular, for Dexia after 2011 and Santander, more than 90% of the final size of β results
from interconnectedness. Thus network effects matter in both parts of the procedure and
their impact on the final measure of systemic relevance is non-negligible.
11We have also experimented with alternative interconnectedness measures without obtaining systemati-
cally different results. This is due to the fact that in most periods, our measure is relatively highly correlated
with alternative measures, such as PageRank or closeness.
12We use the likelihood ratio backtest for conditional VaR (see Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier
(2011)) and compare the median of in-sample p-values.
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5 Conclusions
The paper provides a framework for estimating time-varying systemic risk contributions
of financial entities and applies it to a comprehensive sample of large European banks.
Our measure of realized systemic risk takes into account both the individual riskiness
of the bank as well as the degree of price co-movement with the left tail of the finan-
cial system return distribution, which we refer to as marginal systemic relevance. Not
surprisingly, we find that at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, banks from coun-
tries participating in the EU-IMF programme exhibit the greatest degree of systemic risk
contributions. We document that marginal systemic relevance increases with size, lever-
age, and interconnectedness. Taking these factors into account, banks from programme
countries rank highly in the distribution of realized systemic risk. However, there is a
noticeable difference to the estimated systemic risk ranking during the global financial
crisis with large, global banks ranking at the top.
The systemic risk contributions are based on tail dependence networks that can be used
as monitoring tools and thus are an output of interest in their own right. We show that
the network density varies with the intensity of the financial crisis. We further document
that the fragmentation of the European financial system is reflected by a clustering of tail
dependence relationships at the country level and provide evidence that fragmentation has
peaked. Constructing the networks based on CDS spreads allow for a symmetric treatment
of banks and sovereigns and for an explicit representation of bank-sovereign interactions.
The tail dependence networks reveal a dramatic increase in the interdependence of banks
and sovereigns since the beginning of the financial crisis. While there is evidence that
bank-sovereign interaction has peaked, it is still way above the levels observed before the
crisis.
We believe that our framework can be a useful monitoring device for policy makers.
As it is based on asset prices and the procedure is highly data driven, the resulting tail
dependence networks provide a market view on systemic risk relationships in the banking
system. Such a market view provides a complementary perspective to networks based
on contractual linkages between banks that are visible only by a supervisory authority.
The systemic risk rankings can be likewise used for monitoring purposes. A consistently
high ranking in any of the three risk metrics should trigger a supervisory follow-up. We
caution against mechanically tying the systemic risk measure to a regulatory measure
such as a capital surcharge as advocated by (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson 2012). The
systemic risk ranking produced by our methodology can feed into the regulatory process, a
measure such as a capital surcharge for systemically relevant financial institutions should
be, however, based on a broader set of indicators and considerations.
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Appendix
Selection algorithm for relevant risk drivers
We adapt the data-driven procedure of Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2015) to ac-
count for time-variation in tail risk networks and different types and scalings of potential
risk drivers. Determination of relevant risk drivers R(i,t0) at the beginning of a year t0
uses information of observations from the previous two years on a rolling window basis.
Hence, it is based on approximately τ = 500 observations Rt0−τ , . . . , Rt0−1, where each
Rt is aK-vector of centered observations of the potential regressors. The idea is to use pe-
nalized quantile regression of LASSO-type for model selection and then to re-estimate the
resulting model to obtain unbiased coefficient estimates (see Belloni and Chernozhukov
(2011)). Due to the included sovereigns we modify the procedure in the post-LASSO
selection step into a weighted LASSO for quantiles by introducing data-driven weights
wi,t0k for different components Rt,k. We thus obtain an improved precision in the selection
step (see Wu and Liu (2009)).
The whole methodology works in 3 steps for each institution i in the system at time
point t0:
Step 1: Determine the penalty parameter λi,t0 and the component-specific weights wi,t0
from the data:
Step a) Take τ iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of Rt0−τ , . . . , Rt0−1 denoted as
U1, . . . , Uτ . Conditional on observations of R, calculate the corresponding
value of the random variable,












Step b) Repeat step a) B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λi,t0
conditional on R through Λi,t01 , . . . ,Λ
i,t0
B . For a confidence level α ≤ 1/K in
the selection, set
λi,t0 = c ·Q(Λi,t0 , 1− α|Rt0−), (9)
whereQ(Λi,t0 , 1−α|Rt0−) denotes the (1−α)-quantile of Λi,t0 givenRt0−τ , . . . , Rt0−1
and c ≤ 2 is a constant. Choose α = 0.1 for optimal rates of the post-
penalization estimators as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Generate
λi,t0(c) for different parameter values c on an equi-distant grid.













Set wi,t0k = |ᾰ
i,t0
q,k |−γ with γ > 0. Generate wi,t0(γ) = (w
i,t0




on an equi-distant grid of different γ.
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Step 2: Run an l1-penalized quantile regression and calculate for each (λi,t0(c);wi,t0(γ))



























2 and the loss function ρq(u) = u(q− I(u < 0)), where
the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and zero otherwise.
Step 3: Drop all firms in R with absolute marginal effects |α̃i,t0(c, γ)| below a threshold
a = 0.0001 keeping only the K(i, t0) remaining relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c, γ).
Re-estimate the unrestricted model (11) without penalty only with the selected
relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c, γ). This regression yields the post-LASSO estimates
α̂i,t0q (c, γ). The final estimates are the ones which maximize the in-sample pre-
dictive ability of the resulting VaR specification jointly in c and γ. This is evalu-




Stock returns (daily) CDS returns (daily)
Name ID Country Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Allied Irish Banks alb ie -1.27e-03 0.060
Alpha Bank alp gr -3.20e-04 0.048
BBVA bbv es -1.83e-04 0.024 3.08e-03 0.049
BNP Paribas bnp fr 1.48e-04 0.030 2.95e-03 0.052
Banca Carige crg it -4.49e-04 0.021
Banca Popolare di Milano pmi it -8.39e-04 0.030 2.61e-03 0.039
Bance Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna bpe it -3.94e-04 0.025
Banco BPI bpi pt -6.41e-04 0.025
Banco Comercial Portugues bcp pt -1.01e-03 0.027 3.00e-03 0.043
Banco Popolare SC bpi it -1.28e-03 0.033 2.46e-03 0.045
Banco Popular Espanol pop es -1.11e-03 0.025 3.22e-03 0.057
Banco Santander san es -1.20e-04 0.025 2.99e-03 0.050
Banco de Sabadell sab es -6.18e-04 0.019 2.67e-03 0.038
Bank of Cyprus boc cy -1.18e-03 0.035
Bank of Ireland bki ie -4.51e-04 0.059 3.37e-03 0.050
Bankinter bkt es -1.14e-04 0.026
Barclays bar gb 3.46e-04 0.040 2.84e-03 0.051
Commerzbank cbk de -1.17e-03 0.035 2.64e-03 0.052
Credit Agricole aca fr -2.50e-04 0.032 2.89e-03 0.049
Credit Industriel et Commerciale ccf fr -1.44e-04 0.016
Danske Bank dan dk -1.05e-04 0.025 2.73e-03 0.050
Deutsche Bank dbk de -8.18e-05 0.029 2.39e-03 0.050
Deutsche Postbank dpb de 2.28e-05 0.025
Dexia dex be -1.38e-03 0.069
EFG Eurobank eur gr -8.77e-04 0.056
Erste Group Bank ebs at 1.56e-04 0.034 2.27e-03 0.046
Espirito Santo Financial Group esf pt -6.96e-04 0.013 2.97e-03 0.044
HSBC hsb gb 9.22e-05 0.020 2.58e-03 0.048
ING ing nl 2.80e-05 0.037 2.61e-03 0.044
Intesa Sanpaolo isp it -2.47e-04 0.029 3.64e-03 0.065
Irish Life and Permanent ipm ie -5.09e-04 0.077
KBC kbc be 2.90e-04 0.042
Landesbank Berlin beb de 1.88e-04 0.022
Lloyds llo gb 1.08e-05 0.040 2.88e-03 0.047
Marfin cpb cy -1.69e-03 0.037
Monte dei Paschi bmp it -1.16e-03 0.028 3.29e-03 0.049
National Bank of Greece ete gr -1.05e-03 0.046
Natixis knf fr -4.17e-05 0.037 1.96e-03 0.038
Nordea nda se 3.30e-04 0.024 2.43e-03 0.077
OTP Bank otp hu 2.82e-04 0.029
Piraeus tpe gr -1.09e-03 0.049
Pohjola poh fi 4.26e-04 0.025
Powszechna Kasa pko pl 2.71e-04 0.022
Royal Bank of Scotland rbs gb -5.70e-04 0.042 3.08e-03 0.050
SEB seb se 2.79e-04 0.030 2.66e-03 0.056
Societe Generale gle fr -1.79e-04 0.033 2.88e-03 0.048
Standard Chartered sta gb 5.27e-04 0.028 1.56e-03 0.039
Svenska Handelsbanken shb se 4.46e-04 0.021 2.12e-03 0.071
Swedbank swe se 4.39e-04 0.030
UniCredit ucg it -6.54e-04 0.033 3.00e-03 0.051
Unione di Banche Italiane ubi it -7.28e-04 0.025
Table 1: Banks in the sample
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Bond yields (first diff.; daily) CDS returns (daily)
Country Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
AT -1.06e-03 0.05 3.73e-03 0.07
BE -7.87e-04 0.05
DE -1.28e-03 0.05 4.43e-03 0.09
DK -1.23e-03 0.09 9.76e-04 0.04
ES 3.72e-04 0.08 4.26e-03 0.06
FI -1.14e-03 0.06
FR -9.51e-04 0.05 7.22e-03 0.12
GB -1.25e-03 0.05 1.47e-03 0.04
GR 3.61e-03 0.84
HU -1.01e-03 0.14
IE 1.21e-05 0.10 1.58e-02 0.58
IT 9.64e-05 0.07 2.80e-03 0.05
NL -1.05e-03 0.04 2.34e-03 0.05
PL -7.24e-04 0.06
PT 1.24e-03 0.14 3.60e-03 0.06
SE -1.00e-03 0.05 2.32e-03 0.05
Table 2: Summary statistics sovereigns
(1) (2)








The table shows how network density and the fragmentation as represented by
the share of domestic linkages evolve over time. The networks result from the
LASSO selection procedure as described above and are based on six (overlap-
ping) two-year periods. The networks are based on non-penalized control vari-
ables including bank-specific characteristics, macro-financial state variables
and sovereign bond yields.
Table 3: Characteristics of estimated tail dependence networks based on equity returns of











The table presents the share of domestic linkages between banks of a given
country. In the case of AT, DK, FI, HU, NL, and PL, there is just one bank in
the sample so the quantity is not defined. The column “crisis countries” refers
to the simple average for a group of countries composed of CY, ES, GR, IE,
IT, and PT. “Non-crisis countries” refers to the average over all other countries
in the sample. The networks result from the LASSO selection procedure as
described above and are based on six (overlapping) two-year periods. The
networks are based on non-penalized control variables including bank-specific
characteristics, macro-financial state variables and sovereign bond yields.
Table 4: Share of domestic linkages in estimated tail dependence networks based on
equity returns of 51 European banks, 2006-2013.
(1) (2) (3)
Network Share of domestic Share of sovereign
density linkages bank linkages
2006 0.13 0.22 0.01
2007 0.14 0.20 0.06
2008 0.18 0.20 0.10
2009 0.12 0.30 0.13
2010 0.17 0.32 0.21
2011 0.18 0.23 0.19
The table shows how network density, the fragmentation as represented by the
share of domestic linkages, and sovereign bank interaction evolve over time.
The share of domestic linkages only takes into account connections between
banks. The networks result from the LASSO selection procedure as described
above and are based on six (overlapping) two-year periods. The networks
are based on non-penalized macro-financial state variables when modeling the
VaR of banks and sovereigns.
Table 5: Characteristics of estimated tail dependence networks based on CDS returns of











The table presents the interconnectedness of sovereigns as rep-
resented by degree. The column “crisis countries” refers to the
simple average for a group of countries composed of CY, ES,
GR, IE, IT, and PT. “Non-crisis countries” refers to the aver-
age over all other countries in the sample. The networks re-
sult from the LASSO selection procedure as described above
and are based on six (overlapping) two-year periods. The net-
works are based on non-penalized macro-financial state vari-
ables when modeling the VaR of banks and sovereigns.










The table presents the share of linkages between sovereigns
and banks. The column “crisis countries” refers to the simple
average for a group of countries composed of CY, ES, GR, IE,
IT, and PT. “Non-crisis countries” refers to the average over
all other countries in the sample. The networks result from
the LASSO selection procedure as described above and are
based on six (overlapping) two-year periods. The networks are
based on non-penalized macro-financial state variables when
modeling the VaR of banks and sovereigns.
Table 7: Share of linkages between sovereign and banks
25
Rank Bank name ID Country Realized systemic Systemic V̂ aR
risk β risk β
1 Irish Life and Permanent ipm ie 0.0193 0.1345 0.1432
2 Bank of Cyprus boc cy 0.0136 0.2125 0.0639
3 National Bank of Greece ete gr 0.0131 0.1160 0.1129
4 Dexia dex be 0.0121 0.1583 0.0766
5 Alpha Bank alp gr 0.0100 0.1863 0.0539
6 Royal Bank of Scotland rbs gb 0.0095 0.2259 0.0423
7 Banca Carige crg it 0.0088 0.1059 0.0830
8 Barclays bar gb 0.0082 0.2557 0.0322
9 Marfin cpb cy 0.0075 0.1415 0.0530
10 Natixis knf fr 0.0073 0.2593 0.0281
11 OTP Bank otp hu 0.0072 0.2582 0.0279
12 KBC kbc be 0.0066 0.1355 0.0486
13 Bankinter bkt es 0.0063 0.1530 0.0411
14 Lloyds llo gb 0.0062 0.1741 0.0355
15 Piraeus tpe gr 0.0062 0.1416 0.0437
16 EFG Eurobank eur gr 0.0061 0.1399 0.0433
17 Bank of Ireland bki ie 0.0059 0.1624 0.0361
18 Bance Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna bpe it 0.0055 0.1528 0.0362
19 Commerzbank cbk de 0.0054 0.1532 0.0356
20 Credit Agricole aca fr 0.0053 0.2484 0.0214
21 Danske Bank dan dk 0.0049 0.2052 0.0236
22 Erste Group Bank ebs at 0.0049 0.2024 0.0241
23 Intesa Sanpaolo isp it 0.0049 0.1980 0.0247
24 Credit Industriel et Commerciale ccf fr 0.0046 0.2269 0.0202
25 Banco Santander san es 0.0044 0.2278 0.0193
26 Banco Comercial Portugues bcp pt 0.0042 0.0882 0.0472
27 UniCredit ucg it 0.0042 0.2134 0.0195
28 BBVA bbv es 0.0041 0.2498 0.0164
29 SEB seb se 0.0040 0.2319 0.0173
30 Monte dei Paschi bmp it 0.0039 0.0907 0.0435
31 ING ing nl 0.0039 0.1714 0.0229
32 Standard Chartered sta gb 0.0038 0.2003 0.0191
33 Deutsche Bank dbk de 0.0036 0.1696 0.0215
34 Societe Generale gle fr 0.0035 0.1687 0.0206
35 BNP Paribas bnp fr 0.0034 0.1766 0.0194
36 Banco Popular Espanol pop es 0.0034 0.1163 0.0288
37 Banco BPI bpi pt 0.0033 0.1226 0.0266
38 Unione di Banche Italiane ubi it 0.0029 0.1226 0.0238
39 Banco Popolare SC bpi it 0.0028 0.1207 0.0228
40 Allied Irish Banks alb ie 0.0027 0.0416 0.0646
41 Nordea nda se 0.0026 0.2133 0.0124
42 Pohjola poh fi 0.0026 0.1784 0.0145
43 Swedbank swe se 0.0026 0.1787 0.0145
44 Banca Popolare di Milano pmi it 0.0021 0.1014 0.0209
45 Deutsche Postbank dpb de 0.0020 0.1355 0.0150
46 HSBC hsb gb 0.0020 0.2330 0.0087
47 Banco de Sabadell sab es 0.0018 0.1425 0.0124
48 Svenska Handelsbanken shb se 0.0018 0.1985 0.0090
49 Powszechna Kasa pko pl 0.0015 0.1003 0.0146
50 Landesbank Berlin beb de 0.0012 0.1211 0.0100
51 Espirito Santo Financial Group esf pt 0.0007 0.0863 0.0077
The table ranks banks according to realized systemic risk in June 2012. Realized systemic risk is given by the product of systemic
risk beta and value-at-risk as in Equation (7).
Table 8: Realized systemic risk of 51 European banks, June 2012
26
Bank name Systemic risk β Group Size Leverage Net
Natixis 0.2593 3 6.2299 26.1202 1.3863
OTP Bank 0.2582 1 3.5264 7.3755 1.7918
Barclays 0.2557 3 7.5333 29.0104 1.0986
BBVA 0.2498 3 6.3977 15.3705 1.0986
Credit Agricole 0.2484 3 7.4519 36.1905 1.0986
HSBC 0.2330 2 7.5899 15.9292 1.0986
SEB 0.2319 3 5.5769 21.7143 1.0986
Banco Santander 0.2278 2 7.1572 16.8518 1.3863
Credit Industriel et Commerciale 0.2269 3 5.4523 25.2925 1.0986
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.2259 2 7.4282 19.0981 1.0986
UniCredit 0.2134 2 6.8385 14.5713 0.6931
Nordea 0.2133 3 6.5425 25.9949 0.6931
Bank of Cyprus 0.2125 1 3.6547 15.1471 1.0986
Danske Bank 0.2052 3 6.1540 28.4674 0.6931
Erste Group Bank 0.2024 3 5.3786 17.7028 0.6931
Standard Chartered 0.2003 2 6.1254 13.7613 0.6931
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.1985 3 5.6288 26.9227 0.6931
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.1980 2 6.4810 12.4980 0.0000
Alpha Bank 0.1863 1 4.0530 15.8155 1.0986
Swedbank 0.1787 2 5.3662 19.1752 0.6931
Pohjola 0.1784 1 3.7527 17.0224 0.6931
BNP Paribas 0.1766 3 7.5834 28.0491 0.0000
Lloyds 0.1741 3 7.0558 21.4171 0.0000
ING 0.1714 3 7.1243 25.8275 0.0000
Deutsche Bank 0.1696 3 7.6513 37.5956 0.0000
Societe Generale 0.1687 3 7.0850 28.3256 0.0000
Bank of Ireland 0.1624 2 5.0427 18.3763 0.0000
Dexia 0.1583 3 6.0229 21.4107 0.0000
Commerzbank 0.1532 3 6.5382 36.8333 0.0000
Bankinter 0.1530 2 4.1047 19.6879 0.6931
Bance Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 0.1528 1 4.0969 16.1703 0.6931
Banco de Sabadell 0.1425 1 4.6570 14.8263 1.0986
Piraeus 0.1416 1 3.8606 3.3544 0.6931
Marfin 0.1415 1 3.4617 15.3970 0.0000
EFG Eurobank 0.1399 1 4.2985 2.1094 1.0986
Deutsche Postbank 0.1355 3 5.3287 35.8836 0.0000
KBC 0.1355 2 5.6721 59.4140 0.6931
Irish Life and Permanent 0.1345 2 4.2772 28.7822 0.0000
Banco BPI 0.1226 2 3.8012 39.6606 0.6931
Unione di Banche Italiane 0.1226 1 4.8791 12.7310 1.0986
Landesbank Berlin 0.1211 2 4.9002 49.8018 0.0000
Banco Popolare SC 0.1207 1 4.9048 12.6513 1.0986
Banco Popular Espanol 0.1163 1 5.0639 15.7241 1.0986
National Bank of Greece 0.1160 1 4.6453 2.1094 1.0986
Banca Carige 0.1059 1 3.8607 11.6481 0.0000
Banca Popolare di Milano 0.1014 1 3.9705 13.1303 0.0000
Powszechna Kasa 0.1003 1 3.8250 7.9325 0.0000
Monte dei Paschi 0.0907 1 5.4412 15.9840 1.0986
Banco Comercial Portugues 0.0882 1 4.5221 24.7166 0.0000
Espirito Santo Financial Group 0.0863 2 4.4446 70.8370 0.0000
Allied Irish Banks 0.0416 1 4.9174 15.7617 0.0000
The table ranks banks according to their systemic risk beta in June 2012. Systemic risk beta is a function of size, leverage and
interconnectedness as represented by log(outdegree+ 1). Group refers to the grouping applied in the estimation of Equation (5).
Banks in group 3 have above median size and leverage, while banks in group 1 have below median size and leverage. The remaining
banks constitute group 2.
Table 9: Systemic risk betas and driving components, June 2012
27
Rank Bank name ID Country Realized systemic Systemic V̂ aR
risk β risk β
1 Dexia dex be 0.0362 0.2446 0.1479
2 Bank of Ireland bki ie 0.0316 0.1759 0.1795
3 Royal Bank of Scotland rbs gb 0.0290 0.2307 0.1257
4 Commerzbank cbk de 0.0282 0.2281 0.1235
5 KBC kbc be 0.0280 0.1927 0.1451
6 Credit Agricole aca fr 0.0276 0.2667 0.1037
7 Irish Life and Permanent ipm ie 0.0275 0.1445 0.1899
8 Barclays bar gb 0.0268 0.2057 0.1303
9 Societe Generale gle fr 0.0253 0.2619 0.0965
10 Lloyds llo gb 0.0245 0.2336 0.1051
11 Deutsche Postbank dpb de 0.0245 0.2100 0.1166
12 ING ing nl 0.0243 0.2114 0.1151
13 UniCredit ucg it 0.0209 0.1982 0.1056
14 Allied Irish Banks alb ie 0.0208 0.1553 0.1342
15 Standard Chartered sta gb 0.0190 0.1732 0.1097
16 SEB seb se 0.0180 0.1932 0.0932
17 OTP Bank otp hu 0.0175 0.1169 0.1500
18 Intesa Sanpaolo isp it 0.0172 0.1981 0.0868
19 BNP Paribas bnp fr 0.0170 0.1693 0.1004
20 Bank of Cyprus boc cy 0.0162 0.2279 0.0710
21 Erste Group Bank ebs at 0.0160 0.1464 0.1092
22 Banca Popolare di Milano pmi it 0.0156 0.2186 0.0713
23 Banco Santander san es 0.0152 0.2157 0.0705
24 Pohjola poh fi 0.0150 0.2023 0.0741
25 BBVA bbv es 0.0149 0.2807 0.0533
26 Piraeus tpe gr 0.0148 0.2355 0.0626
27 Deutsche Bank dbk de 0.0143 0.1521 0.0941
28 Svenska Handelsbanken shb se 0.0139 0.2433 0.0571
29 Swedbank swe se 0.0131 0.1752 0.0748
31 HSBC hsb gb 0.0128 0.2266 0.0566
30 Marfin cpb cy 0.0128 0.2066 0.0620
33 Alpha Bank alp gr 0.0126 0.1820 0.0694
32 Banco Popolare SC bpi it 0.0126 0.1441 0.0872
34 Powszechna Kasa pko pl 0.0117 0.2070 0.0566
35 National Bank of Greece ete gr 0.0116 0.1409 0.0822
36 Nordea nda se 0.0111 0.2370 0.0470
37 Banco Popular Espanol pop es 0.0110 0.2093 0.0524
38 Danske Bank dan dk 0.0109 0.1509 0.0725
40 Bance Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna bpe it 0.0107 0.1973 0.0544
39 Banco Comercial Portugues bcp pt 0.0107 0.1840 0.0579
41 Landesbank Berlin beb de 0.0105 0.1111 0.0946
42 Natixis knf fr 0.0098 0.1558 0.0627
43 Banca Carige crg it 0.0089 0.1838 0.0487
44 Banco BPI bpi pt 0.0079 0.1461 0.0542
45 EFG Eurobank eur gr 0.0075 0.1700 0.0437
46 Banco de Sabadell sab es 0.0070 0.2734 0.0258
47 Bankinter bkt es 0.0069 0.1547 0.0444
48 Unione di Banche Italiane ubi it 0.0066 0.1244 0.0527
49 Credit Industriel et Commerciale ccf fr 0.0064 0.2248 0.0286
50 Espirito Santo Financial Group esf pt 0.0038 0.0868 0.0438
51 Monte dei Paschi bmp it 0.0032 0.0697 0.0455
The table ranks banks according to realized systemic risk in October 2008. Realized systemic risk is given by the product of
systemic risk beta and value-at-risk as in Equation (7).
Table 10: Realized systemic risk of 51 European banks, October 2008
28
Bank name Systemic risk β Group Size Leverage Net
BBVA 0.2807 3 6.2305 20.1084 1.6094
Banco de Sabadell 0.2734 1 4.3880 17.2724 2.4849
Credit Agricole 0.2667 3 7.2895 36.5858 1.3863
Societe Generale 0.2619 3 6.9809 36.7140 1.3863
Dexia 0.2446 3 6.4347 47.3055 1.3863
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.2433 3 5.3006 28.2589 1.3863
Nordea 0.2370 3 6.0725 24.6836 1.0986
Piraeus 0.2355 1 3.9532 17.1094 1.6094
Lloyds 0.2336 3 6.1427 29.9180 1.0986
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.2307 2 7.6798 28.1315 1.7918
Commerzbank 0.2281 3 6.4220 41.5008 1.0986
Bank of Cyprus 0.2279 1 3.4521 15.8218 1.0986
HSBC 0.2266 2 7.3892 17.9267 1.0986
Credit Industriel et Commerciale 0.2248 3 5.5251 29.1889 1.0986
Banca Popolare di Milano 0.2186 1 3.8237 13.0968 1.3863
Banco Santander 0.2157 2 6.9010 18.9559 1.0986
ING 0.2114 3 7.2225 40.6074 0.6931
Deutsche Postbank 0.2100 3 5.4223 44.9140 1.0986
Banco Popular Espanol 0.2093 1 4.6937 16.6799 1.9459
Powszechna Kasa 0.2070 1 3.5589 9.5414 1.0986
Marfin 0.2066 1 3.5632 9.4828 1.0986
Barclays 0.2057 3 7.4546 51.6146 0.6931
Pohjola 0.2023 1 3.3490 15.1767 0.6931
UniCredit 0.1982 2 6.9658 20.2044 0.0000
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.1981 2 6.4484 11.9451 0.0000
Bance Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 0.1973 1 3.9232 16.7478 1.0986
SEB 0.1932 3 5.4983 30.8818 0.6931
KBC 0.1927 2 5.9332 22.0918 1.0986
Banco Comercial Portugues 0.1840 1 4.5392 20.0341 1.3863
Banca Carige 0.1838 1 3.4222 8.8829 0.6931
Alpha Bank 0.1820 1 4.0538 13.8021 1.0986
Bank of Ireland 0.1759 2 5.2854 29.0040 1.3863
Swedbank 0.1752 2 5.1673 23.9362 1.0986
Standard Chartered 0.1732 2 5.4214 15.6492 0.0000
EFG Eurobank 0.1700 1 4.3495 17.7473 1.0986
BNP Paribas 0.1693 3 7.4351 34.0321 0.0000
Natixis 0.1558 3 6.2538 28.4809 0.0000
Allied Irish Banks 0.1553 1 5.1810 19.2902 1.6094
Bankinter 0.1547 2 3.9154 26.9901 1.6094
Deutsche Bank 0.1521 3 7.5993 57.4133 0.0000
Danske Bank 0.1509 3 6.1500 32.4465 0.0000
Erste Group Bank 0.1464 3 5.3648 23.5646 0.0000
Banco BPI 0.1461 2 3.7039 24.1041 1.0986
Irish Life and Permanent 0.1445 2 4.3828 31.1468 0.6931
Banco Popolare SC 0.1441 1 4.8677 12.0214 1.3863
National Bank of Greece 0.1409 1 4.5490 10.6437 1.0986
Unione di Banche Italiane 0.1244 1 4.7935 10.7961 1.0986
OTP Bank 0.1169 1 3.6267 9.2577 0.0000
Landesbank Berlin 0.1111 2 4.9886 59.4149 0.0000
Espirito Santo Financial Group 0.0868 2 4.3273 86.3160 1.3863
Monte dei Paschi 0.0697 1 5.3304 17.2038 0.6931
The table ranks banks according to their systemic risk beta in October 2008. Systemic risk beta is a function of size, leverage and
interconnectedness as represented by log(outdegree+ 1). Group refers to the grouping applied in the estimation of Equation (5).
Banks in group 3 have above median size and leverage, while banks in group 1 have below median size and leverage. The remaining
banks constitute group 2.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Risk metrics and capital injections, fourth quarter 2008
The figure compares the distributions of systemic risk beta, Value-at-Risk, and realized systemic risk con-
ditional on whether a bank was re-capitalized in the fourth quarter of 2008.




















































0 Realized systemic risk
Figure 8: Risk metrics and capital injections, second quarter 2012
The figure compares the distributions of systemic risk beta, Value-at-Risk, and realized systemic risk con-
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